Iran’s military offensive will serve as clear proof that the Gulf States’ policy of containment toward Iran has failed, said Ohad Merlin, Middle East expert at MIND Israel.
Since the outbreak of the recent Iran-Israel war, some analysts have suggested that the confrontation may drive Gulf States towards normalization with the Jewish State.
This argument centers on the idea that Iran’s unprecedented targeting of its neighbors – such as strikes on Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman – may lead these countries to ally with Israel in a united anti-Islamic regime front.
“The fact that Iran has completely lost control and has begun firing in all directions could serve as a significant platform for strengthening relations between Israel and its neighbors,” Ohad Merlin, Middle East expert at MIND Israel, told The Jerusalem Post last week.
He argued that Iran’s military offensive will serve as clear proof that the Gulf States’ policy of containment toward Iran has failed, and that “Iran is now perceived as the destabilizing force, after two years in which it was fashionable to blame Israel in the Gulf.”
There is merit to this argument; a shared security interest, the view of Iran as a common threat, and the precedent of the Abraham Accords could all be factors that propel normalization in theory.
Iran and Iraq map. Ilustration. (credit: SHUTTERSTOCK)
However, this analysis vastly overlooks the deep reservoir of anti-Israel and antisemitic sentiment within Gulf societies. Just because these countries may develop antipathy towards Iran does not de facto mean they will soften their policies on Israel. And even in the cases where governments cooperate quietly with Israel (or by proxy of the US), public opinion often remains overwhelmingly hostile.
Gulf public opinion still blocks Israel normalization
Gulf States may also develop resentment towards Israel and the US for dragging them into a war they never wanted. In fact, one could argue that much of the incentive for normalization before the Iran conflict stemmed from the idea of allying against a common enemy. However, now that the conflict is a reality, not just a possibility, and given that Iran has been weakened, the incentive of normalization as a security imperative may no longer stand.
According to the Arab Opinion Index, 87% of respondents oppose recognition of Israel, while only 6 percent said they would accept it.
Despite Israeli normalization agreements with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, the percentage of those who supported recognition of Israel dropped by two percentage points in 2024/25 compared to 2022/23.
Libya and Jordan have the highest levels of opposition to normalization (96 percent and 95 percent, respectively), followed by Kuwait (94 percent), Palestine (91 percent), and Lebanon, Morocco, and Qatar (89 percent each).
In Saudi Arabia, support for relations with Israel dropped to about 20% during the Gaza war, while 96% favored ending Arab ties with Israel.
Zionism, or general Israel support, is also still seen as something of a curse word in Arab society. There has been a significant uptick in Arab media and social media condemnation of the UAE as an ‘Arab Zionist’ state.
Yemeni, Saudi, and Maghrebi media have all run articles labeling the UAE a ‘Zionist’ traitor state.
In fact, the Arab Journal claimed these countries are being targeted by Iran because of “their increasing involvement in the Zionist-American conspiracy.”
The former Tunisian foreign minister said, “The UAE has paid the price for its strategic alliance with Israel and for transforming itself into an advanced Hebrew military and financial base in the heart of the Gulf. Today it is tasting some of the poison it made other Arab and Islamic countries drink through arrogance with wealth, injustice, and aggression without right.”
The American Jewish Committee expressed concern over Arab social media posts “that seem intent on sowing misunderstanding and division between US allies in the Arabian Gulf, undermining the Abraham Accords, and promoting conspiracy narratives about Israel and Jews.”
“Attempts to label the UAE as acting on behalf of Israel or “Zionists” are false, dishonorable, and distract from the real strategic choices facing the region.”
These examples highlight how the sentiment on the ground remains deeply unfavourable to both the idea of normalization and the concept of a Jewish State in general.
It is also worth noting that the Abraham Accords were driven more by diplomatic deals between the upper echelons of wealthy politicians and change-makers, not grassroots peace. While Gulf monarchies have pursued quiet cooperation with Israel (security, intelligence, technology), public opinion itself has remained skeptical or hostile.
Additionally, the ongoing war has shown that cultural narratives go beyond opposition to Israeli policy. Anti-Jewish religious rhetoric and conspiracy narratives are prevalent.
Thousands of posts on Arab-language X in the last day alone blame Jews for the war.
“The enemies of Islam are Jews and the war is clearly between infidelity and Islam,” read one.
“Everyone has always known that the Jews are the cause of discord,” reads another. “In order to live, there is no alternative but to cut off the head of the Zionist-American snake.”
“Muslims are being killed in Iran, Lebanon, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE. It’s the war of the Jews and the Americans, and we are in the middle. They strike us so that Muslims will fight each other,” read a third.
Conspiracy narratives such as Jews controlling global media or finance, or Jews orchestrating regional conflicts are surging. And these narratives blur the line between anti-Israel politics and antisemitic mythology, making it impossible to differentiate one from another.
So while elites may see Israel as a strategic partner against Iran, the public often views Israel as a greater threat or moral enemy. This creates a strategic dilemma for Gulf rulers.
For example, polls show only about 20% of Saudis support cooperation with Israel against Iran, so for Saudi to move toward normalization, it would have to go directly against the vast majority of its people.
And given the overwhelming distrust towards Jews and Israelis, they may not want to take that risk.
True normalization is unlikely so long as the societal barriers of anti-Israel and antisemitic narratives that frame Israel and Jews as existential enemies persist.
Normalization in the Gulf is ultimately a geopolitical project imposed from above, not a societal reconciliation, and if it were the latter, it is unlikely to happen any time soon.
As long as public discourse continues to portray Israel, and often Jews themselves, as existential enemies, the assumption that regional war will naturally produce normalization may prove overly optimistic.