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It has been 26 days since Hamas launched its attacks on Israel. In my column<\/a> a few days after the conflict began, I said that international law offered a framework for analyzing what was happening, even while the atrocities committed by Hamas were still being documented, and as the consequences of Israel\u2019s devastating airstrikes on Gaza and cutoff of food, water and fuel were beginning to unfold.<\/p>\n I stand by that. But I also know that for many readers, the events of the weeks since \u2014 the rising civilian death toll in Gaza, the continued holding of hostages by Hamas, and the seeming inability of world leaders to agree on a way to protect civilians \u2014 pose a profound and vexing question: Is there actually a point to these laws if it\u2019s so hard to enforce them?<\/p>\n Yes. But like any tool, international law has limitations as well as strengths. I\u2019m going to dig into those by trying to answer some of the broad questions I\u2019ve heard from readers and other commentators.<\/p>\n The laws of war are not designed to outlaw fighting completely, or even to ban all killings of civilians. Rather, they set minimum requirements for a situation in which our usual moral rules (for instance, \u201cDon\u2019t kill other human beings\u201d) have already been suspended and our usual ways for resolving disagreements have failed. In practical terms, as sad as it is, that means that acts of war can be horrifying without necessarily being illegal.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n \u201cInternational humanitarian law often looks to us quite permissive if we think about violence in moral terms,\u201d said Janina Dill, co-director of the Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law, and Armed Conflict<\/a>. \u201cA starved civilian, a displaced civilian, a dead civilian \u2014 none of that, on its own, is evidence for a violation of the law.\u201d<\/p>\n Consider, for instance, the rule that attacks on military targets must not cause \u201cdisproportionate\u201d civilian harm. This is one of the foundational principles of humanitarian law and is designed to protect civilians. But it also presupposes a grim reality: that some<\/em> civilian deaths might be proportional. The value of striking a particular base of enemy operations, for example, could be considered so high that attacking it would be legal, even if that meant killing some nearby civilians.<\/p>\n All parties to a conflict have an obligation to carefully weigh the facts and make sure the proportionality requirements are met before carrying out any attack. But of course, these decisions can be fraught and subject to disagreement.<\/p>\n The laws do carry weight, even though (like all laws) they aren\u2019t always followed. Committing war crimes can damage a country\u2019s international standing and jeopardize alliances. Many militaries employ full-time lawyers to advise on questions like proportionality. And even many secessionist movements and rebel groups<\/a> follow international humanitarian law \u2014 or at least publicly claim to \u2014 as a way to gain credibility.<\/p>\n Although the rules are minimal, they are universal. And they stay in force no matter how dirty a war gets. Violations by one party do not justify violations by another \u2014 a helpful way to get distance from the bitter debate over which side of the conflict has the greater claim to moral right or historical grievance.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n Take, for instance, the issue of human shields. It is a war crime<\/a> to use civilians\u2019 presence to shield a particular military target from attack. Israel has claimed that Hamas operates from within hospitals and other civilian buildings as a way to protect itself. Hamas denies doing so.<\/p>\n But whether Hamas does or doesn\u2019t use civilians as human shields, Israel\u2019s legal responsibility to protect those civilians remains the same: It cannot disproportionately harm them, or target them directly.<\/p>\n International law is not connected to any international police force or to a fast-acting court system. There\u2019s no global 911 for war crimes.<\/p>\n Investigations of war crimes and crimes against humanity often take years to complete, and don\u2019t necessarily lead to criminal charges. The International Criminal Court in The Hague, which was established in 2002, has limited resources. It describes itself as \u201ca court of last resort,<\/a>\u201d aiming to complement, not replace, domestic courts. But domestic courts are often reluctant to prosecute their own leaders and troops.<\/p>\n The I.C.C. has occasionally acted more quickly. In 2022, following a referral from more than 40 member states, the court began investigating Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine \u2014 even though neither Ukraine nor Russia are I.C.C. members. And in March this year, the court issued an arrest warrant for President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia for crimes related to his invasion of Ukraine. But the court\u2019s powers are still limited: Putin can\u2019t actually be arrested unless he travels to a country that chooses to enforce the warrant, which he is unlikely to do.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n Some argue that the threat of future prosecution can have some deterrent power. The I.C.C. can say, \u201chere\u2019s what the law is, let me make clear to all the parties that we are watching you, we are documenting what you are doing, and there will be prosecutions coming down the line,\u201d said Rebecca Hamilton, a law professor at American University who previously worked in the I.C.C. prosecutor\u2019s office.<\/p>\n Collective punishment is when a person or group is punished for an act that someone else committed. As the Red Cross says<\/a>, it is a war crime, as well as a violation of international humanitarian law<\/a>. (It\u2019s worth noting, however, that collective punishment is not one of the war crimes that the I.C.C. has jurisdiction over<\/a>, though it could be prosecuted in a domestic court.)<\/p>\n The prohibition on collective punishment is \u201cone of the central, fundamental rules of international humanitarian law,\u201d said Shane Darcy, a professor at the National University of Ireland Galway and a leading expert on that issue.<\/p>\n But not all attacks on civilians violate that rule.<\/p>\n \u201cWe should distinguish between the legal concept of collective punishment and the ordinary, moral concept of collective punishment,\u201d said Adil Haque, an international law expert at Rutgers University. To violate the law against collective punishment, the acts must be done in order to punish a person or group. Acts done with another purpose, or simply with careless disregard for civilian lives, wouldn\u2019t qualify \u2014 though of course they might violate other laws.<\/p>\n In recent weeks, Israel has been accused numerous times of collective punishment, including by a group of U.N. independent experts. They released a statement<\/a> saying that Israel\u2019s \u201cindiscriminate military attacks against the people of Gaza\u201d amount to \u201ccollective punishment.\u201d And the U.N. secretary general, Ant\u00f3nio Guterres, said<\/a> late last month that Hamas\u2019s attacks on Israel \u201ccannot justify the collective punishment of the Palestinian people,\u201d and that \u201ceven war has rules.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n There is some evidence that points to Israel\u2019s intent to collectively punish civilians in this conflict, Darcy said. \u201cI think the clearest example is the statement of the siege, that there will be no fuel, electricity or supplies allowed in until the hostages are handed over,\u201d he said, referring to comments made by Israel\u2019s defense minister, Yoav Gallant, and energy minister, Israel Katz.<\/p>\n On Tuesday, the Israeli authority for the Palestinian territories said<\/a> that it is monitoring supplies of food, water and fuel and that \u201cthe situation is far from crisis.\u201d However, those claims contrast sharply with reports from the United Nations, humanitarian aid groups and individuals within Gaza that civilians are suffering from dire shortages of basic necessities.<\/p>\n \u201cIt\u2019s illegal for the I.D.F. to bar humanitarian relief for any reason, whether to punish the people of Gaza or to make things more difficult for Hamas,\u201d Haque said, referring to Israel\u2019s military, the Israel Defense Forces. \u201cSimilarly, it\u2019s illegal for Hamas to hold civilians hostage for any reason, whether to punish the hostages for the actions of their government, or to use the hostages as leverage for a prisoner exchange.\u201d<\/p>\n Thank you for being a subscriber<\/strong><\/p>\n Read past editions of the newsletter here<\/a>.<\/p>\n If you\u2019re enjoying what you\u2019re reading, please consider recommending it to others. They can sign up here<\/a>. Browse all of our subscriber-only newsletters here<\/a>.<\/p>\n I\u2019d love your feedback on this newsletter. Please email thoughts and suggestions to interpreter@nytimes.com<\/a>. You can also follow me on Twitter<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\nIf a wartime attack kills innocent people, how could it be legal?<\/h2>\n
If the laws of war are so limited, what are they good for?<\/h2>\n
Will anybody ever stand trial?<\/h2>\n
What about the accusations of collective punishment?<\/h2>\n
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