{"id":56953,"date":"2026-02-22T14:59:03","date_gmt":"2026-02-22T19:59:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/newssprinters.com\/index.php\/world\/israel-moves-to-contain-hezbollah-before-iran-clash\/22\/02\/2026\/"},"modified":"2026-02-22T14:59:03","modified_gmt":"2026-02-22T19:59:03","slug":"israel-moves-to-contain-hezbollah-before-iran-clash","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/newssprinters.com\/index.php\/world\/israel-moves-to-contain-hezbollah-before-iran-clash\/22\/02\/2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Israel moves to contain Hezbollah before Iran clash"},"content":{"rendered":"

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Israel intensifies strikes on Hezbollah\u2019s missile sites, preparing for potential conflict with Iran and reducing the group’s threat capacity.<\/p>\n

Israel\u2019s latest strikes in Lebanon<\/a> are not just another round in the slow-burning shadow war with Hezbollah. They are part of something larger: an effort to ensure that if the US \u2013 or Israel \u2013 strikes Iran<\/a>, Tehran\u2019s most powerful proxy will not be able to carry out the mission it was built for.<\/p>\n

For decades, Hezbollah<\/a> has served as Iran\u2019s forward deterrent against Israel, with an arsenal amassed on Israel\u2019s northern border designed to unleash massive rocket and missile fire in the event Iran\u2019s nuclear facilities or regime come under attack. That strategic logic has not changed. What has changed is Israel\u2019s determination to degrade that capability before a wider confrontation begins.<\/p>\n

On Friday, Israel carried out strikes deep in the Bekaa Valley, which \u2013 according to Lebanese officials \u2013 killed at least 10 people and eliminated several Hezbollah missile-unit commanders.<\/p>\n

This fits into a pattern that has intensified over the past month: sustained IDF action targeting long-range missile sites, command centers, and Hezbollah\u2019s efforts to rebuild military infrastructure. These strikes, Israeli officials acknowledge, are meant to disrupt the group\u2019s readiness and force build-up, including missile units planning future attacks on Israel.<\/p>\n

The timing is telling. A similar surge in Israeli activity took place late last May, just weeks before the June 2025 war with Iran. Then, as now, Israel appeared intent on degrading Hezbollah\u2019s capabilities before events elsewhere triggered escalation.<\/p>\n

Hezbollah did not launch a missile barrage during the 12-Day War<\/h3>\n

What makes that comparison particularly relevant now is what happened next \u2013 or rather, what did not happen.<\/p>\n

Despite longstanding Israeli assumptions that any attack on Iran would automatically trigger massive rocket fire from Lebanon, Hezbollah did not launch a sustained missile barrage during the 12-day war \u2013 the feared all-out northern front never materialized.<\/p>\n

Why Hezbollah stayed restrained remains debated. One explanation is that the group had little appetite for inviting Israeli attacks that could have further degraded its military infrastructure, already devastated during the Israel-Hamas War<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Another explanation concerns domestic pressure. Lebanon is economically shattered and politically fragile. A decision to unleash massive rocket barrages in the service of Iran \u2013 one that would have invited heavy retaliation from Israel \u2013 could have triggered sharp backlash from Lebanese political leaders and large segments of the public asking why the country should again be dragged into a war not its own.<\/p>\n

Whatever the mix of considerations, the restraint was notable. There is no guarantee, however, that those same calculations will hold this time, especially if the Iranian regime believes it is facing a do-or-die moment.<\/p>\n

The Iranians appear not to be taking any chances with Hezbollah this time.<\/p>\n

Arab media reports suggest Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps personnel are operating inside Lebanon and advising Hezbollah on operational planning. If Tehran concludes that its core assets are under threat, it may decide that its northern lever must be activated \u2013 and reportedly has personnel on the ground to ensure orders to do so are implemented.<\/p>\n

The tempo of Israeli strikes<\/h3>\n

That possibility helps explain the tempo of Israeli strikes.<\/p>\n

January alone saw 87 Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon \u2013 more than double December\u2019s number and the highest number since the ceasefire went into effect in November 2024 \u2013 with roughly half targeting infrastructure north of the Litani River, Hezbollah\u2019s operational heartland, according to the Alma Research and Education Center.<\/p>\n

February has also seen intense action, including drone strikes, artillery fire, and targeted eliminations. The campaign appears designed to reduce Hezbollah\u2019s ability to launch large-scale fire if ordered to do so.<\/p>\n

Lebanon\u2019s internal political landscape adds another layer of complexity.<\/p>\n

President Joseph Aoun has called for international intervention to halt Israeli strikes, warning that Lebanon\u2019s involvement in a wider war would have devastating consequences. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam has described the current situation as a \u201cone-sided war of attrition.\u201d Influential Lebanese political figures are reportedly urging neutrality, concerned that Hezbollah could drag the country into a regional war not of its choosing.<\/p>\n

That tension strikes at the core of Hezbollah\u2019s domestic narrative. The group portrays itself as the \u201cdefender of Lebanon.\u201d But if it launches massive rocket barrages in response to an Iran-related escalation \u2013 prompting extensive Israeli retaliation \u2013 that image would fracture, and the organization\u2019s legitimacy inside Lebanon would be dented.<\/p>\n

Israeli officials have indicated that escalation would not remain confined to tit-for-tat exchanges. In past confrontations, such dynamics have expanded beyond individual launch sites to broader strikes against Hezbollah\u2019s military infrastructure, with the risk that Lebanese infrastructure could be hit as well.<\/p>\n

Israel\u2019s overall posture toward Lebanon since October 7 has changed dramatically. As Brig.-Gen. Yuval Gez, commander of the IDF\u2019s 91st Division, told leaders of northern communities last week: \u201cOur responsibility is not only to respond, but to anticipate, initiate and defend.\u201d<\/p>\n

He said the IDF was prepared for \u201cvarious scenarios,\u201d with forces deployed along the entire border and deep into Lebanese territory. The language suggests preparation not only for deterrence, but for rapid escalation.<\/p>\n

The central question is whether Hezbollah will once again remain on the sidelines if confrontation erupts between Israel and Iran, or whether Tehran will decide that this is the moment to activate the asset it has invested billions of dollars in building up precisely for this purpose.<\/p>\n

Israel\u2019s current strategy is designed to shape that decision before it is made. By degrading missile units, targeting command centers, and keeping up the military pressure, Jerusalem is seeking to ensure that even if Hezbollah chooses to fire, its capacity to damage is reduced.<\/p>\n

It is also sending a message to the organization that if it acts on Iran\u2019s orders, the consequences will be devastating.<\/p>\n

One thing is clear: Israel is no longer assuming that last year\u2019s restraint will hold. If Tehran pulls the Hezbollah lever this time, Jerusalem is working to ensure that there will be far less force behind it.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Israel intensifies strikes on Hezbollah’s missile sites, preparing for potential conflict with Iran and reducing the group’s threat capacity. Israel’s latest strikes