\n<\/p>\n
An electoral earthquake<\/a> has fractured Germany’s societal and political tectonic plates. In a state election on Sunday, the far-right Alternative for Germany<\/a> <\/strong>party won 43.8% of the vote in Saxony-Anhalt, <\/strong>a state of roughly two million people in the eastern part of the country.<\/p>\n When Friedrich Merz first campaigned to lead Germany’s conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU), in 2018, he vowed to reduce support for the far-right AfD in half. In a bitter irony, Chancellor Merz’s CDU lost half its support in Saxony-Anhalt and after its resounding victory the AfD has become a direct threat to his leadership, and is beginning to overturn Germany’s postwar political order.<\/p>\n The drubbing in Saxony-Anhalt may be only the beginning. Two more regional elections are scheduled later this month and could demonstrate the growing strength of Germany’s fringe parties <\/strong>and intensify pressure on Merz’s governing coalition in Berlin.\u00a0<\/p>\n The AfD is more than a political disruptor. German domestic intelligence has classified<\/a> <\/strong>parts of the party, including its Saxony-Anhalt chapter, as right-wing extremist. Yet the AfD has overtaken the CDU in national polls<\/a>,<\/strong> while Merz’s approval ratings<\/a> <\/strong>have fallen to levels unprecedented for a German chancellor.<\/p>\n Although Merz has backtracked on campaign promises, most notably his commitment to uphold the debt brake<\/a>\u2014loosening the constitutional limit on government borrowing\u2014he has remained resolute in preserving the “firewall” between the CDU and AfD. That firewall is intended to keep Germany anchored in its postwar democracy deliberately constructed with guardrails against its darkest history to prevent backsliding into authoritarianism.<\/p>\n The AfD has used Merz’s flip flop on the debt brake against him and is questioning defense spending on Ukraine.<\/p>\n Upon taking office in May 2025, a little over a year ago, Merz promised<\/a> <\/strong>to revive Germany’s stagnant\u00a0economy\u00a0and\u00a0increase defense spending to position the country as Europe’s de facto military leader. An\u00a0antagonistic Russia and an unreliable America have left Germany with few alternatives. German businesses are suffering with high costs, American tariffs and intensifying competition from China.<\/p>\n Merz\u00a0also made another defining promise: to beat back the AfD and restore the centrist CDU’s \u00a0claim to being the true conservative party in Germany. Instead, the election in Saxony-Anhalt will amplify calls, including from within his own party, for him to step aside.<\/p>\n Merz’s blunders over the past year cannot be dismissed as the mistakes of a political novice. He is a seasoned operator who, unlike many of his German peers, has extensive experience in the private sector. He promised an ambitious program of reforms to tackle Germany’s welfare and pension programs, but his proposals were too tepid and too late. And his poor communication style has also overshadowed his efforts on curbing migration and his diplomatic<\/a> campaign <\/strong>across Europe to sustain support for Ukraine.\u00a0<\/p>\n The CDU’s predicament is not surprising. Merz\u00a0has never been a particularly beloved figure,\u00a0and\u00a0the\u00a0grand coalition between the conservatives and the Social Democratic Party was hardly the outcome<\/a> German voters desired <\/strong>after the federal election last year.\u00a0<\/p>\n After the Federal Republic of Germany was established in 1949, there had been only \u00a0single Grand Coalition government during the first four decades.\u00a0But Merz’s government\u00a0is the fourth\u00a0Grand Coalition government in Germany in the\u00a0last two decades. This coalition, was supposed to be different: it was formed to enact far-reaching reforms and hold the AfD at bay. So far, it has done neither. \u00a0<\/p>\n The\u00a0AfD\u00a0began in 2013 as a movement of anti-euro skeptics<\/a>.<\/strong> It has since become a\u00a0nationwide\u00a0force, building its constituency through\u00a0relentless opposition to immigration, nativist appeal and efforts to relativize Germany’s Nazi\u00a0past.\u00a0An anemic German economy<\/a> and frustration\u00a0with the established parties have accelerated<\/a> its rise. The AfD\u00a0is now the leading political party in Germany with support from nearly one-third<\/a> of German voters.\u00a0<\/p>\n Like its far-right counterparts elsewhere in Europe, the AfD\u00a0has prospered by channeling voters’ anger and grievance<\/a>. Until now, however, it has remained in opposition. No other German party\u00a0has been willing to forge a parliamentary coalition<\/a> with the\u00a0AfD, and even some European far-right parties\u00a0consider the\u00a0AfD\u00a0so radical that they prefer\u00a0to keep it at arm’s length.\u00a0<\/p>\n The AfD’s victory in Saxony-Anhalt and other upcoming regional elections could change that dynamic.\u00a0Although the CDU and the AfD hold overlapping\u00a0positions<\/a> on migration and some social questions,\u00a0the\u00a0AfD’s\u00a0hostility toward Germany’s culture of historical remembrance<\/a> is fundamentally incompatible with the country’s center-right tradition.<\/p>\nThe center cannot hold<\/strong><\/h3>\n
The age of anger<\/strong><\/h3>\n