Putin is in terminal trouble – on many levels. Let us consider the acuteness of his predicament, the likely outcomes, and the potential time lines. Here is my recent interview where I predict Putin’s demise on a prominent podcast, namely Sebastian Junger’s substack. Junger is a world-renowned war journalist, award-winning author and documentary maker. (He also wrote The Perfect Storm book that became the movie – and a new phrase in our language. I recommend his substack with the greatest enthusiasm.)
Due to incessant Ukrainian drone strikes Crimea is virtually cut off from fuel. A traffic jam of cars many miles long trying to leave the peninsula at peak tourist season makes for bad optics. The Russians only have one last conduit for fuel supplies: the Kerch bridge – a highly symbolic piece of architecture, bombed many times but still standing. Gasoline trucks going across will present a ripe target, promising a massive fireball should they be hit in a strike. My sources inside Ukrainian intelligence tell me such a strike on a massive scale is imminent.
We all know how the tide has turned in the Ukraine war, but the optics matter as much as the reality on the ground. When disasters occur so singular that neither Putin nor the Russian public can ignore them, the reality itself shifts. The entire barbaric Ukraine adventure will look like a catastrophe. Putin cannot avoid the tarnish. Indeed, when he cannot even control the optics the effect gets multiplied, the clock starts ticking toward his end. Loss of credibility leads to loss of legitimacy in a despotic regime.
A Russian military blogger, Aleksandr Lunin, veteran of the Ukraine invasion, recently put out a video warning of mutiny and demanding a personal televised interview with Putin. He spoke of secrets told him by higher-ups he needed to impart to Putin. Last count it had 11million views. He followed up with another video softening his stance but that in turn was quickly followed by a supporting video from a group of soldiers threatening to turn their guns on their torturing officers. Lunin is now in jail. The Prighozin revolt comes vividly to the public mind.
Videos of Ukrainian strikes against military, electrical and fuel installations both near Moscow and in remote Russian regions are constantly circulated. Weeping women influencers unable to find gas for their cars are ubiquitous. Meanwhile, videos also circulate of men on Russian streets being forcibly press-ganged into the army. Often with relatives trying to block their abductors’ vehicles. Why aren’t the enforcers themselves serving on the front lines is the question asked on the streets.
Let us not forget that, historically, regime change occurred and Moscow’s empire collapsed twice over the last century because of disastrous foreign military campaigns – WW1 and the invasion of Afghanistan.
As the pressure builds on Putin, elites around him are thinking about their own fates, and finding the likes of Aleksandr Lunin to voice their fears. The populace can only deduce that either Putin is responsible or the elites around him are insulating him from realizing and rectifying the situation. At first, they will blame the elites. Which is why the elites will mutiny even before the army does – out of fear.
This column predicted the 2022 invasion of Ukraine a month ahead, and the disastrous outcome, when most so-called experts and journalists disdained the very likelihood.
Putin has a series of failsafe defenses, the equivalent of praetorian guards. He has his own bodyguard units, including a number of security militias such as the FSB, the internal ministry troops or national guard (Rosgvardia with 300k troops) and 30,000 of direct bodyguard elements, the police and the like. He has used them to counteract each other over the years. But they also each represent a threat, with loyalty foremost to their own boss. A civil war among them is one scenario.
The question of how Putin’s end will happen rather depends on what outcome is planned. To kill Putin quickly and then fight for power means neutralizing his threat up front against any plotters before loyalists can react. But that also eradicates a crucial option – to mount a show trial and scapegoat him for all the ills of his rule, thus absolving others. This allows the system and its elites to stay in place with minimum chaos. One might call it the Ceausescu option. In that instance, the notorious Cold War-era Romanian despot was quickly executed (with his wife) by military top brass while his former elites went on to run things under a nominally democratic system.
That such scenarios are posing a threat can be gleaned from the recent mysterious death of Sergei Ivanov, Putin’s longtime ally and friend, on June 26 at age 73. Ivanov was also seen as his likely successor for years.He was that rare character at the top who had such power and impunity that he actually dared criticize the situation at times. The Kremlin announced his passing promptly without giving out any cause of death. Ivanov, close to Putin from the 1970s onwards, was distanced from official power several times but remained very well connected to the FSB.
This kind of incident creates problems for Putin. As potential rivals get summarily deleted others will see themselves in danger and move against him in anticipation. With paranoia multiplying around him, anything could trigger the end. More highly dramatic Ukrainian attacks on Moscow. Food shortages. Secessionist uprisings in the provinces like Tatarstan or Bashkortistan or Chechnya. Ukraine invading Crimea. Above all, the actions of China. If Beijing decides Putin as a weakening leader is a liability to its own interests, it can trigger his downfall in various ways. By cutting off war aid. By moving into Siberia. As it is, the PRC severely limits its help for the Russian economy. Already, it has refused to fund the direct-to-China Siberia 2 pipeline.
Putin’s days are numbered. If the arc of narrative persists or worsens he is likely to be toppled within three years.
This article was originally published on Forbes.com