Turkey’s war of words, and its boundaries

Words are one thing; actions are another. It is one thing for Erdogan to fulminate regularly against Israel. But talk of invasion?

The Turkish-initiated war of words with Israel, which ebbs and flows depending on Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s moods and domestic political situation, risked spilling overboard when The Telegraph reported that he had threatened to invade Israel.

The only problem with the story is that the threat was not carried out, at least not yet. According to the report, Erdogan indicated that Turkey could use military force against Israel over its actions in Lebanon, citing past Turkish interventions in Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh and saying there was “no reason” not to act.

But the story was apparently based on an old quote, something Erdogan reportedly said in 2024 about Gaza, not in the current context. That distinction, given the ongoing war in the Middle East, is not trivial. It is crucial.

Equally telling was the response.

The Center for Combating Disinformation – a name that sounds like something out of a Monty Python sketch – a bureau within the office of Turkey’s presidency, quickly issued a statement rejecting as unfounded claims that Erdogan had suggested Turkey might invade Israel.

“The assertions in these posts do not reflect the facts and constitute narratives intended to undermine regional stability,” the statement said, adding that “manipulative content that seeks to distort Türkiye’s efforts and humanitarian stance should not be given credence.”

What is striking here is not only the denial itself, but the fact that such a denial was deemed necessary. Erdogan – who regularly compares Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Hitler, calls Israel a terrorist state, and accuses it of genocide – is not exactly known for rhetorical restraint.

Words over actions

Yet here, the Turkish government moved quickly to draw a line. Words are one thing; actions are another, the statement effectively suggested. It is one thing for Erdogan to fulminate regularly against Israel. But talk of invasion?

That crosses into a different category – one with potential consequences.

Turkey is not the only country that maintains such a body to address misinformation and false reports, but governments typically do not mobilize these units or issue formal statements in response to a single media report unless they perceive a risk.

And in this case, Ankara clearly did.

The primary risk is misinterpretation, which can lead to escalation. If Erdogan were understood to be issuing an actual threat, Israel could treat it as signaling and respond accordingly. Others – including the US – might also feel compelled to react.

The combating disinformation unit’s intervention, therefore, appears less about correcting the record in a narrow sense and more about preventing a narrative from becoming perceived policy.

That risk was not theoretical.

The narrative was already gaining traction, prompting a feature in Israel Hayom on Tuesday asking, “Could Turkey Really Invade Israel?” – a question that, once posed, begins to shape perceptions regardless of the underlying facts and one that cuts against Ankara’s effort to position itself, alongside Pakistan and Egypt, as a mediator in the current crisis with Iran.

The timing only heightened those concerns. The report surfaced just days after a Turkish court indicted Netanyahu and 35 other Israelis, including Defense Minister Israel Katz and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, for the naval interception of the Sumud Gaza flotilla last year that included Greta Thunberg.

Netanyahu, Katz, and Ben-Gvir all responded sharply on social media to the indictments. Netanyahu accused Erdogan of accommodating terrorists and “massacring his own Kurdish citizens.”

Katz called him a “paper tiger” who failed to respond to Iranian missile fire on Turkish territory and said he would do well to “sit quietly and shut up.” Ben-Gvir dispensed with all subtlety: “Erdogan, do you understand English? F*** you.”

Ankara’s response only deepened the rhetorical clash.

The Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a statement describing Netanyahu as someone “who has been described as the Hitler of our time” – a striking claim, particularly coming from a ministry that houses a bureau dedicated to combating disinformation.

“Netanyahu’s current objective is to undermine ongoing peace negotiations and continue his expansionist policies in the region. Failing this, he risks being tried in his own country and is likely to be sentenced to imprisonment,” the statement read.

“The fact that our president has been targeted by Israeli officials with baseless, brazen, and false allegations is a result of the discomfort caused by the truths we have consistently voiced on every platform.”

That escalation was evident elsewhere as well.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on Monday that Israel “cannot live without an enemy” and was now trying to cast Turkey in that role – a sign that, even as Ankara moved to tamp down interpretations of military intent, the rhetorical temperature between the two countries continued to rise.

Fidan’s comment is also more than a little ironic, given that it is Erdogan who, for much of the past two decades, has cast Israel as an adversary – a posture that has served both to elevate his standing in the Arab and Muslim worlds and to score points at home when politically expedient.

All of this formed the backdrop when The Telegraph published the story – one it later removed, with a senior editor acknowledging on X/Twitter that the quotes were either old or possibly fabricated, and issued an apology.

Turkey has long walked a tightrope: on the one hand, extremely harsh rhetoric toward Israel; on the other, a consistent avoidance of direct military involvement. The rhetoric bolsters its standing in parts of the Muslim world, but it has not translated into any move toward direct military confrontation with Israel.

This is not the first time Erdogan’s rhetoric has edged toward implied action without crossing into it.

In the aftermath of the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident in 2010, he warned that Turkey could send naval escorts to future ships, signaling a willingness to challenge Israel at sea. That, too, stopped short of implementation.

The pattern is familiar: threatening language implying capability without committing to it – strong enough to resonate and win points for Erdogan among the publics he is courting, but non-committal enough to walk back.

With this latest denial, Ankara is not so much retreating from its rhetoric as clarifying its limits.

Despite all the incendiary language, Turkey has been careful not to cross the line from words to deeds.

Ankara’s concern this time seemed to be that the line might blur, that rhetoric could become perceived intent, and that this perceived intent could then lead to miscalculations that would only add fuel to a region already in flames – and that at a time when Turkey, no less, wants to play the role of mediator in the current crisis with Iran.